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The image of the "Other" in the contacts of Europe, Asia, Africa and America
Michal C. Jankowski (Warsaw, Poland)
Dealing with the other. A question of political consensusOne of the targets of universalism is sarch for a synthesis of multiple views. The heart of the matter, however, does not concern eclecticism, of which the conceptions of political liberalism formulated by the late John Rawls could be suspected. Universalism may propose the creation of such a synthesis via the ideas of the multi-levelness of identification and conjunctive thought, while Rawls, assisted by the idea of an overlapping consensus and the public sphere, indicates the universal elements of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which could comprise a foundation for an agreement as regards the contents of the public sphere. Limitations to the public sphere, conceived as shared by all reasonable views, are rejected by universalism, which presumes that the sphere of total agreement is a universe "embracing the human environment", part of an "integrated universe humanised by means of thought, imagination, experience and co-creation-based on a verifiable material and social reality". In other words, neither the contents of the agreement nor its object can be arbitrarily excluded. It is also impossible to a priori restrict the area of the agreement, contained within our cognitive potential which changes together with the development of science.
From the perspective of liberal thought an important reflection proposed by universalism includes the indication of the possibility of distinguishing assorted types of a consensus, making it possible to reach an understanding and to create a synthesis shared by all. We may differentiate between (1) the meta-ontological consensus (to use this cursory term), which consists in the recognition of that which "may be proven scientifically", and (2) the consensus of rational discourse, which consists in an agreement concerning the "meaning and sense of all the differentiated world outlooks".
In the consensus of the first variety, the object of the agreement will entail both the natural and the social sciences, albeit only those which are simultaneously rationally and empirically verifiable. The construction of such a consensus should be, therefore, based on research methodology concurrent with the postulate of the unity of science. In the case of the second type of a consensus, the ontological status of the natural and social "contents" is determined by an agreement concerning their "degree of intensity and types of existence" (e.g. aesthetic and ethical opinions).
At this point, there appears a certain difficulty linked with the conviction that meta-ontology makes it possible to verify agreement based on a consensus of yet another type. This conviction can be treated as a postulate of the multi-level nature of identification, and we may recognise that within individual choices the process of reaching an agreement within the Universe is possible thanks to assorted types of a consensus.
The reconstruction of the Rawlsian idea of the overlapping consensus in order to explain the agreement shared by the Other within the contents of universalism leads to the conviction that the justification of certain conceptions (for example, theological, materialistic) does not have to be connected with reference to a different foundation of the justification, most often beyond meta-ontology understood in the aforementioned manner. Universalism can possess a single basis of justification: the agreement of all the members co-creating the Universe, envisaged as an area of total agreement based on dialogue, which renders possible the synergy of views.
The political project of universalism indicates also a multiplicity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines in society, by examining it as the problem of multiplicity and unity. Such universalism may act in the spirit of political liberalism: to propose the idea of a consensus which re-creates the public sphere. For universalism, such a public sphere, which is to embrace all reasonable comprehensive doctrines, is science: the model of unity and diversity. There emerges the question whether this limitation will not, as in the case of political liberalism, leave, e.g. religious views outside the object of the reflections pursued by universalism. Due to the presupposed limitations, political liberalism leaves those opinions outside the sphere of an overlapping consensus, a step by no means controversial since by proposing unity it does not negate the principle of pluralism. In its capacity as a view, universalism wishes to encompass the Other's spheres of life and the Other's doctrines, although with diversely intensified approval. The ensuing, apparently reasonable query asks whether science is capable of tackling those principles in the case of religious doctrines?If the answer is affirmative, then it becomes necessary to ask whether the scientific method constitutes a suitable criterion for resolving every problem. I have in mind a successive limitation of political liberalism, whose realisation is considered suitable only in Western societies. The absence of such a restriction (at least explicitly) in the case of the project of universalism, which accepts a model of integration encompassing all the Other's cultures and societies (and, at present, accepting increasingly distinctly the perspective of universal civilisation) could become the foundation for demonstrating the utopia of this conception.
In my presentation I shall argue that dealing with the Other in political context does not necessarily lead to a 'clash'. The need for consensus may force us rather to (1) escape from "the false opposition between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft"(*) as Habermas puts it; (2) redefinition of liberal concepts of civil society (open society?) (3) de-emphasizing communitarians' concerns over the plight of 'asocial individuals'.
(*) See Jürgen Habermas, "Preface", in The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory, Ciaran Cronin, Pablo De Greiff (Ed.), translated by Ciaran Cronin, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts 1998, p. xxxv.
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